UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-9-2017

In re SRBA Case No. 39576 Respondent's Brief 2
Dckt. 44636

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"In re SRBA Case No. 39576 Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 44636" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6727.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6727

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Docket No. 44636-2016

Jn tbt 6uprtmt Court of tbt 6tatt of Jbabo
In Re SRBA Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 65-23531 and 65-23532

BLACK CANYON IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Appellant,
v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE STATE OF IDAHO, and SUEZ WATER IDAHO
INC.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ
(Black Canyon Appeal)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
The State ofldaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls,
Honorable Eric J. Wildman, Presiding

Andrew J. W aldera [ISB No. 6608]
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC

1101 W River St, Ste 110
PO Box 7985
Boise, ID 83 707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
Counsel for Appellant
Black Canyon Irrigation District

Christopher H. Meyer [ISB No. 4461]
Michael P. Lawrence [ISB No. 7288]
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

601 W Bannock St
POBox2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1236
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Counsel for Respondent
Suez Water Idaho Inc.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ- BLACK CANYON APPEAL- NO. 44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)
13719751_1 / 30-151

Page 1 of 49

Chas. F. McDevitt [ISB No. 835)
CHAS. F. MCDEVITT LAW OFFICE
420 W Bannock St
PO Box 1543
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 412-5250
Counsel for Appellant
Black Canyon Irrigation District

David L. Negri [ISB No. 6697)
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
550 W Fort St, MSC 033
Boise, ID 83724-0101
Telephone: (208) 334-1936
Facsimile: (208) 334-1414
Counsel for Respondent
United States ofAmerica

Clive J. Strong
Michael C. Orr [ISB No. 6720)
Deputy Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

700 W Jefferson St, 2nd Floor
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 334-2690
Counsel for Respondent
State ofIdaho
Jeffrey H. Wood
Acting Assistant Attorney General
John L. Smeltzer [D.C. Bar No. 434585)
Appellate Section
Environment and Natural Resources
Division
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PO Box 7415, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Telephone: (202) 305-0343
Counsel for Respondent
United States ofAmerica

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ-BLACK CANYON APPEAL- No.
13719751_1 / 30-151

44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

Page 2 of 49

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................................ 6
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................... 9

11
The Payette Adjudication bars the Late Claims .................................................... 11
If the Late Claims are not barred by the Payette Adjudication, it will be no
easy task to prove them up .................................................................................... 16
This is not the appropriate proceeding to determine whether Storage Rights
include priority refill entitlements (as explained below they do not) ................... 22
A.
The Storage Rights' decrees issued more than a decade ago
unambiguously define their nature and extent. ......................................... 23
B.
The Storage Rights' decrees are final and should not be subject to
collateral attack in these Late Claims proceedings ................................... 24
C.
The Director of IDWR has the duty and discretion to administer the
Storage Rights according to their decrees and Idaho law ......................... 26
The Storage Rights do not include priority refill entitlements, but Idaho's
Prior Appropriation Doctrine nevertheless authorizes second fill with "excess
water" so long as other rights are not harmed ....................................................... 29
A.
The Storage Rights are entitled to one fill under priority based on the
amount of storable inflow entering the reservoirs .................................... 30
(1)
The essential elements of priority date and quantity must be
given effect. ................................................................................... 33
(2)
Junior water rights are entitled to protection................................ 37
(3)
Idaho law and policy requires the maximum use of the State's
water resources .............................................................................. 3 8
(4)
The State ofldaho must retain control over the distribution of
water.............................................................................................. 41
B.
The Bureau's existing Storage Rights inherently authorize the capture
of excess water so long as other rights are not injured ............................. 44
Suez is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. ........................................................... 47

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................

I.
IL
III.

IV.

V.

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..............................................................................................................

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ - BLACK CANYON APPEAL 13719751_1 / 30·151

N 0. 44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

48

Page 3 of 49

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 958 P .2d
568 (1997) ........................................................................................................................ 44, 45
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. State, 157 Idaho 385,336 P.3d 792 (2014) .......................... 8, 28, 31, 41
Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 433 (2007) ............. 18, 20, 45
Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414, 18 P.3d 219 (2001) ......................... 31
Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 87 U.S. 670 (1874) ................................................................ 39
Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,233 P.3d 102 (2010) .................................................................. 23
City ofPocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830,275 P.3d 845 (2012) ........................................... 31, 37
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,252 P.3d 71 (2011) .............................. 40
Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461,690 P.2d 916 (1984) .................................................... 13, 24, 25
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,277 P.3d 337 (2012) ............................................................. 24
Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irrigation District, Ltd., 16 Idaho
525, 102 P. 481 (1909) .......................................................................................................... 39
Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. and Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water
Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454,926 P.2d 1301 (1996) .................................................. 31
Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. IDWR, 160 Idaho 119,369 P.3d 897 (2016) ................... 18, 38, 40
Jenkins v. State, Dept. of Water Res., 103 Idaho 384,647 P.2d 1256 (1982) .............................. 37
Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926 (1990) .......................... 38, 39, 43
Lee v. Hanford, 21 Idaho 327, 121 P. 558 (1912) ........................................................................ 39
Mullinix v. Killgore 's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269, 346 P.3d 286
(2015) ......................................................................................................................... 13, 25, 26
Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 558 P.2d 1048 (1977) ........................................................ 41
Nidayv. Barker, 16 Idaho 73,101 P. 254 (1909) ......................................................................... 39
Nielson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 488 (1911) .................................................................... 19
Parker v. Wallentine, 103 Idaho 506, 650 P.2d 648 (1982) ......................................................... 42
Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496,356 P.2d 61 (1960) ................................................................. 39
Rangen, Inc. v. IDWR, 159 Idaho 798,367 P.3d 193 (2016) ............................... 23, 24, 25, 26, 28
Rayl v. Salmon River Canal Co., 66 Idaho 199, 157 P.2d 76 (1945) ........................................... 41
Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 32 S.Ct. 470 (1912) ......... 18, 38, 39, 40
State ofIdaho v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 Idaho 329,955 P.2d 1108 1112
(1998) ......................................................................................................................... 33, 44, 45
Van Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202, 89 P. 752 (1907) ............................................................ 37, 38
Village ofPeckv. Denison, 92 Idaho 747,450 P.2d 310 (1969) .................................................. 34
Washington County Irrigation Dist. v. Ta/boy, 55 Idaho 382, 43 P.2d 943 (1935) ..................... 46
Statutes
43 U.S.C. § 383 ............................................................................................................................. 42
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) ................................................................................................................ 47
Idaho Code§ 12-117(2) ................................................................................................................ 47
Idaho Code § 42-1411 (2) .............................................................................................................. 25
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ- BLACK CANYON APPEAL-NO. 44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)
13719751_1 I 30-151

Page 4 of 49

Idaho Code § 42-1412( 6) .............................................................................................................. 25
Idaho Code§ 42-602 ............................................................................................................... 28, 41

Other Authorities
Idaho Const. art. 15, § 3 .......................................................................................................... 42, 45
Rules
Id. R. Civ. P.
Id. R. Civ. P.
Id. R. Civ. P.
Id. R. Civ. P.

42 ............................................................................................................................. 13
54(b) .............................................................................................................. 8, 11, 12
60 ............................................................................................................................. 47
60(b) .......................................................................................................................... 8

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ- BLACK CANYON APPEAL-NO.
13719751_1 / 30·151

44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

Page 5 of 49

This is the response brief on appeal of Respondent Suez Water Idaho Inc. ("Suez"). This
brief responds to the opening brief ("BCID Brief') filed by Appellant Black Canyon Irrigation
District ("Black Canyon") in appeal No. 44636. Suez is filing a substantively identical brief in
response to the opening brief(" US Brief') in related appeal No. 44635 brought by the United
States of America ("United States") (which is a respondent in this appeal and an appellant in
appeal No. 44635). The other respondent is the State ofldaho ("State"). In this brief, Suez
refers to the United States and Black Canyon collectively as the Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a decision by the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA")
Court to disallow the United States' late claim Nos. 65-23531 and 65-23532 (the "Late Claims")
for so-called "second fill" or "refill" storage rights in connection with two federal on-stream
reservoirs, Deadwood and Cascade, operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") in
the Payette River basin.
The Late Claims assert water rights developed under the constitutional method that are in
addition to the Bureau's decreed storage water rights for the Deadwood and Cascade Reservoirs
(the "Storage Rights"). 1 The Storage Rights authorize the storage and beneficial use of water for
irrigation, municipal, and power purposes. Storage and release for the federal government's
flood control operations are not authorized purposes of use of these rights.
According to the United States, the Late Claims were filed to secure water rights that
operate under priority (i.e., with the ability to call out or injure other rights)2 to "complete one

1 The

Storage Rights are numbered 65-2927 A and 65-2927B for Cascade Reservoir (partial decrees issued
March 31, 2003); and 65-2917 and 65-9483 for Deadwood Reservoir (partial decrees issued May 6, 2003, and
March 31, 2003, respectively). R. at 543-57 (copies of the Storage Rights' partial decrees).
2 The phrase "under priority," "in priority," and "under right of priority'' all mean the same thing in the
context of this litigation. Saying that a diversion to storage occurs in or under priority simply means that that the
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physical fill of [the Bureau's] reservoirs in years when it must release stored water for flood
control." R. at 18. In other words, the Late Claims represent claimed entitlements to store water
in addition to the annual volume authorized under the Storage Rights.
The Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or "Department") recommended
that the Late Claims be disallowed because they were "not claimed in [the] prior adjudication,"
R. at 44, (i.e., the "Payette Adjudication"). 3 The United States objected to IDWR's

recommendation (Black Canyon later intervened). Ultimately, the SRBA Court disallowed the
Late Claims on grounds that they are barred by the express terms of final judgment entered in the
Payette Adjudication, by general principles of res judicata, and by operation of statute in effect
during the Payette Adjudication. R. at 2511-18.
The SRBA Court did not address whether, absent the Payette Adjudication's preclusive
effect, the Late Claims could or should be decreed on their merits. Indeed, the Appellants never
even attempted to prove up the Late Claims with evidence or argument supporting "refill" rights
by showing diversion and beneficial use under the constitutional method of appropriation.
Instead, they took the position that their own Late Claims were "unnecessary" because, they
argued, the underlying Storage Rights include the right to fill and refill under-priority. 4
Essentially, the Appellants said, "Please instruct the Department to administer the S,torage Rights
in a way that makes the Late Claims redundant and unnecessary."

storage right holder has the right to divert at that time pursuant to right of priority, i.e., to the detriment of users with
junior priorities.
3 The Payette Adjudication is Gem County Case No. 3667, In the Matter of the General Determination of
the Right to the Use ofSurface and Groundwater ofthe Payette River Drainage.

R. at 1882 (Black Canyon's footnote 3 stating that the Late Claims are "unnecessary"); R. at 2271 (United
States' footnote 3 stating support for argument that Late Claims are "unnecessary"). See also R. at 2518 (SRBA
Court recognizing Black Canyon's argument that the Late Claims are "unnecessary").
4
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Thus, the core of the United States' and Black Canyon's litigation is an attack on the
Department's accounting methodology. The SRBA Court wisely recognized that the claimants'
argument amounted to a collateral attack on the previously decreed Storage Rights and that the
SRBA is not the proper forum to address accounting issues. R. at 2518-19. The Storage Rights
were decreed over a decade ago and were certified as final judgments under Rule 54(b). No
appeal was taken, nor was any attempt made to reopen them in the SRBA under Idaho R. Civ. P.
60(b). The SRBA Court explained, correctly, that if the claimants or users wish to raise issues of
administration now, "then the water right holder must take up the matter first with the Director,
not the Court who issued the decree." R. at 2519.
As this Court noted in the Basin Wide 17 litigation, the Director of IDWR has discretion,
subject to judicial review, to establish an accounting methodology and to distribute water
accordingly. A & B Irrigation Dist. v. State ("BW 17"), 157 Idaho 385, 394, 336 P.3d 792, 801
(2014). The Director subjected his accounting methodology to review in a contested case in
Basin 63, which is now on appeal to this Court. Neither Appellant elected to participate in that
contested case, its judicial review, or the pending appeals. 5 The Appellants seek to end-run that
process by using these Basin 65 Late Claims proceedings not to establish new water rights, but to
reopen and modify the Storage Rights to address questions of administration. Specifically, they
seek to avoid the deference owed to the Director by shoehorning their objections to the
accounting methodology into their Late Claims case. Having given clear direction in its BW 17
decision and elsewhere, this Court should not tolerate this end run.

The Basin 63 appeals are pending with this Court under Docket Nos. 44677-2016, 44745-2017, and
44746-2017. The United States has storage rights directly at issue in the Basin 63 appeals. Black Canyon does not,
but could have sought to participate in the proceedings below. In any event, either of them could have petitioned to
initiate a similar proceeding specifically addressing their Basin 65 rights.
5
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The simple answer to these appeals is to affirm the District Court's conclusion that the
Appellants' arguments about accounting methods are procedurally and jurisdictionally barred.
Suez addresses those jurisdictional issues, but will devote much of its brief to the merits of the
accounting challenge and to proof issues on the Late Claims. In doing so, Suez does not wish to
convey the impression that these issues are properly before the Court. Suez underscores its firm
conviction that there is no reason for the Court to reach them. They are presented only out of an
abundance of caution.
An affirmance of the District Court will have relatively limited impact beyond this case.
In contrast, a reversal could have far-reaching consequences. A decision in favor of the
Appellants would seriously undermine the finality of decrees entered in general stream
adjudications. Moreover, a decision allowing storage water right holders to refill in priority
would fundamentally up-end Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. In this case alone, it would
allow the federal government to store and release water for essentially any purpose ad infinitum
to the injury of juniors and future appropriators. This would transfer control of Idaho's water to
the federal reservoir operators. Rather than fulfilling its statutory duty to distribute water rights
in accordance with Idaho law, the Department would be relegated to observer status.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

In addition to the issues identified by the other parties, Suez presents the following issues
that may become relevant if this Court determines not to affirm the District Court's decision that
the Late Claims are precluded:
1.

To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the release of water

accrued to the original storage rights was necessary and not wasteful? [Yes.]
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2.

To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the quantity of water

claimed was actually stored and beneficially used in quantities exceeding the amounts stored
under the original storage rights? [Yes.]
3.

To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the diversion and use of

water was not merely an historical practice or undertaken pursuant to their ancillary right to store
"excess water" under the Storage Rights? [Yes.]
4.

If the Late Claims could be proven up in any quantity, would they be fully

subordinated to future appropriations? [Yes.]
5.

If the Late Claims could be proven up in any quantity, have they been fully or

partially forfeited or abandoned? [Yes.]
6.

Under Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine and the Maximum Use Doctrine, are

holders of on-stream storage rights entitled, even in the absence of a remark or other express
authorization on the face of the water right, to store and put to beneficial use "excess water" after
the water right has been satisfied once when sufficient water is available to also satisfy all other
water rights then in priority? [Yes.]
7.

Should this authority to take "excess water" without harming others be viewed as

part of, ancillary to, or pursuant to the Storage Rights? [Yes.]
8.

Is the practice of crediting all physically and legally available water to the Storage

Rights consistent with and compelled by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine and the Maximum
Use Doctrine? [Yes.]
9.

Should Suez be awarded attorney fees on appeal? [Yes.]
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE PAYETTE ADJUDICATION BARS THE LATE CLAIMS.

The SRBA Court correctly held that the Late Claims are barred by the express terms of
final judgment entered in the Payette Adjudication, by general principles of res judicata, and by
operation of statute in effect during the Payette Adjudication. R. at 2511-18. The Appellants
argue this was error. It is not.
The Department issued "Proposed Findings of Water Rights in the Payette River
Drainage Basin" ("Proposed Findings") that expressly held that anyone who failed to claim

water rights within the basin "has forfeited such rights." R. 2512 (SRBA Court); R. at 524
(Proposed Findings). The Appellants say this Court should ignore that provision because the
Proposed Findings are not binding. This overlooks that fact that the Partial Decree Pursuant To
Rule 54(b) lR.C.P. ("Payette Decree") issued by the Payette Adjudication Court on January 26,

1986 referenced and (at least) implicitly adopted and incorporated the Proposed Findings. R. at
450-454. 6
The Payette Decree addressed two categories of water rights: claims not being decreed,
and claims being decreed. The category of claims not being decreed included those portions of
the Proposed Finding "still involved in unresolved objections," plus some other specific rights
not relevant here. 7 R. at 451-52. The category of claims being decreed included those listed in
the Proposed Findings, as altered by certain orders and stipulations, and excluding the specific
claims described in the first category. R. at 452.

The Payette Decree described the Proposed Findings as containing "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Statutory and Decreed Rights not Claimed, Claims Submitted: Recommended to be Disallowed; Surface
Water Rights, and Groundwater Rights." R. at 450.
6

The claims not being decreed included: (1) the specific claims being listed in its Exhibit A, (2) the federal
reserved water right claims by the U.S. Forest Service (listed in its Exhibit B), and (3) those water rights which were
part of the court decision in Branson v. Miracle, 107 Idaho 221 (1984).
7
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These two categories described the universe of decreed and potential water rights in the
Payette River Drainage Basin. R. at 452 ("the water rights of the Payette River Drainage Basin
... are as described" in the Proposed Finding, as amended by certain orders and stipulations, and
excluding the specific claims described in the first category). The Storage Rights fell within the
category of claims being decreed. The Late Claims, of course, do not fall within either category.
Thus, the Payette Decree did not leave the door open for any other (i.e., late) claims. Nowhere
does it suggest that additional claims could be filed.
The Payette Decree was certified as final under Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P. R. at 453. As
plainly stated in the Notice ofEntry ofPartial Decree dated January 21, 1986, this required that
"any appeal of this partial decree must be filed with the district court within 42 days of January
21, 1986. That is, on or before Tuesday, March 4, 1986, anyone objecting to the partial decree,
must physically file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Gem County District Court." R. at
487. No appeal was taken.
The United States was a party to the Payette Adjudication, but it did not claim rights like
those asserted in the Late Claims. It filed storage water right claims for Cascade and Deadwood
Reservoirs based on prior state-issued licenses, which were included in the Payette Decree and
now are reflected in the Storage Rights decreed by the SRBA Court. The rights asserted under
the Late Claims were not in the specific list of claims excluded from the Payette Decree. The
Payette Decree, by incorporating the Proposed Findings, expressly decreed "all rights
established before October 19, 1977," R. at 524, and further declared that "[a]ny water user who
heretofore diverted surface water or ground water ... and who, upon being joined to this action,
failed to claim such water rights has forfeited such rights" under the forfeiture statute in effect at
the time. R. at 524. Thus, the Late Claims are barred.
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The timing of the Payette Decree and the commencement of the SRBA further support
the conclusion that the SRBA is not merely an extension of the "unfinished" Payette
Adjudication. Nor were these two pending actions consolidated under Rule 42, I.R.C.P. The
Director of IDWR filed his petition to commence the SRBA on June 17, 1986-roughly five
months after the Payette Decree was issued, and more than three months after the appeal
deadline expired. In other words, the SRBA and the Payette Adjudication could not have been
consolidated because they were never pending at the same time. Nothing in the Payette Decree
suggests that Judge Doolittle intended the SRBA to be a continuation of the Payette
Adjudication.
In addition to holding that the Payette Decree 's express language bars the Late Claims,
the SRBA Court also correctly held that the Late Claims are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. 8 A water rights decree is "conclusive proof of diversion of the water, and of
application of the water to beneficial use, i.e., the decree is res judicata as to the water rights at
issue [in a subsequent proceeding]." Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461,465, 690 P.2d 916,920
(1984), quoted in Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269,277,346 P.3d
286,294 (2015). There is no exception to resjudicata that would relieve the Late Claims from
its operation.
The facts here are simple. The Late Claims reflect claims for 1965 priority date storage
water rights under the constitutional method of appropriation. This requires evidence of actual

8 "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same
claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190, 207
P.3d 162, 166 -167 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[l]n an action between the same parties upon the
same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the
first suit." Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437,849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993). This Court has
stated that "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. at 437, 849 P.2d at 110.
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diversion and beneficial use of water prior to 1971 (when the Idaho Legislature cut off beneficial
use claims for surface water.)
If the Late Claims have any merit now (an issue that is not before the Court in this
appeal, and which as described below Suez strongly questions), that same merit must have
existed during the Payette Adjudication since it conclusively adjudicated all rights prior to 1977.
The claimed 1965 priority date means the Late Claims, if they ever were valid, must have been
appropriated-i.e., come into existence-more than five years prior to the Payette Adjudication's
commencement.
So if the Late Claims can be proven up now, they could have been proven up in the
Payette Adjudication. The relevant evidence and legal principles were exactly the same then as
they are now. Then, as now, the law requires evidence of actual diversion and actual beneficial
use of water prior to 1971 to prove up a water right under the constitutional method. This legal
standard has existed since 1971, when the Idaho legislature outlawed the constitutional method
of appropriation. Obviously, it existed when the Payette Decree was issued in 1986. Even more
obvious, all pre-1971 evidence that the Appellants might assert to support the Late Claims today
must have existed during the Payette Adjudication.
The sole reason the Appellants contend the Late Claims could not have been claimed in
the Payette Adjudication is because the Department adopted its Basin 65 computerized
accounting system in 1992. But post-1971 evidence cannot change pre-1971 evidence. Even
Black Canyon agreed with this simple notion in the proceedings below. R. at 1880-81 (Black
Canyon arguing that post-1971 evidence in the record is not relevant). If the holder of a decreed
water right has a "light bulb moment" when the Department does something administratively
years after the decree, that is not a basis to re-open the decree. Indeed, the whole purpose of res
judicata is to make litigants do their thinking before the decree is issued.
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In any event, the Department's accounting methodologies (or lack thereof) at any given
time do not define water rights or dictate Idaho's law of prior appropriation. The alleged lack of
IDWR administration up to 1965 is not relevant to the definition of the Late Claims, and the
Department's implementation of its computerized accounting system in 1992 did not define or
retroactively change whatever rights were already appropriated. Again, even Black Canyon
seemed to agree with this in the proceedings below. R. at 1890 (Black Canyon arguing that
"[ a]dministrative accounting methods, no matter how obtuse, do not define the property rights at
issue.").
As discussed below (and which Suez's briefing in the Basin 63 appeals will address at
length), the principles of one-fill, storable inflow, paper fill, and "excess water" refill are part
and parcel of Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. These fundamental legal principles existed
before the Department incorporated them into its computerized accounting programs, despite the
fact that they may previously have been ignored. In other words, these principles have been
confirmed and implemented, but were not created, by the Department's accounting systems.
Thus, even if an accounting protocol can define a water right (which it cannot), and even
if post-1971 circumstances could change pre-1971 evidence of diversion and beneficial use
(which it cannot), the fact that in 1992 the Department implemented accounting principles that
adhere to Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine does not mean the Late Claims could not have
been asserted in the Payette Adjudication. If, as has been alleged, the federal reservoirs have
"for decades" operated for flood control without flood control water rights, the Bureau could
have and should have wondered how those operations affected its storage rights which authorize
storage of water for beneficial uses but not flood control. The Bureau could have and should
have claimed in the Payette Adjudication whatever additional rights might be necessary to refill
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its reservoirs for beneficial uses after releasing or bypassing water for flood control. But it made
no such claims. Now they are barred.
II.

IF THE LATE CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAYETTE ADJUDICATION, IT
WILL BE NO EASY TASK TO PROVE THEM UP.

If this Court determines that the Late Claims are not precluded by the Payette
Adjudication, the next question would be: can the Late Claims be proven up on their alleged
merits? The record shows that neither the United States nor Black Canyon attempted to make
this showing in the proceedings below. Indeed, they take the same approach on appeal, arguing
that the Late Claims are unnecessary because, they contend, the Storage Rights already include
priority refill entitlements. US Brief at 40-41; BCID Brief at 24-30. As explained in Sections III
and IV below, this is not the appropriate proceeding to make that determination and, in any case,
the Storage Rights do not include such entitlements. In this proceeding, where the issue involves
whether the Late Claims can (and have been) be proven, the Appellants have utterly failed to
take the opportunity to make that showing with evidence of actual diversion and beneficial use,
and they should not get another chance.
The Late Claims reflect water rights claimed under the constitutional method of
appropriation that are in addition to the Storage Rights. That was what the Appellants were
supposed to show in the proceedings below. R. at 174 (SRBA Court order stating "the burden
now rests with the claimants to come forward with evidence to ... establish the existence of the
rights under the constitutional method of appropriation. To do so, the claimants must establish
the two essentials for obtaining a water right under the constitutional method-diversion and
application of the water to a beneficial use."). The Appellants did not attempt to make that
showing, and Suez believes they cannot.
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In the proceedings below, the State ofIdaho's Motion for Summary Judgment advanced
the argument that there is no factual basis supporting the Late Claims. R. at 1572 ("The Bureau
is incapable of carrying its burden of proving actual beneficial use of the additional storage water
claimed under the Late Claims.") Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Appellants were
then obligated to put on evidence showing that material facts were in dispute concerning the
merits of the Late Claims. They elected not to do so, instead simply relying on bald assertions
that the Late Claims can be recognized because the United States has "for decades" physically
refilled reservoirs following flood control releases and the Storage Rights demonstrate that "the
quantity of water provided by one physical fill of the reservoirs has been applied to beneficial
use." R. at 1904 (the United States' brief in response to summary judgment). See also R. at
1892-94 (similar assertions in Black Canyon's summary judgment brief).
The Appellants apparently believe that proving up a beneficial use claim for multiple fills
of a reservoir that already has an existing storage right is a trivial task. They say, in essence:
"Everybody knows that the reservoirs have refilled after flood releases. And everybody knows
that the water in the reservoir is used to irrigate the lands described under the decreed storage
rights. Based on those two facts, we are entitled to 'supplemental' beneficial use rights to store
and release and store again, in priority, all of the storable water that comes down the river. " 9
That is their position in a nutshell. However, it is wrong. If the Late Claims proceed, the
Appellants face substantial hurdles to prove them up.

The Appellants like to describe the Late Claims as "supplemental" water right claims, as though that
moniker might make these unique, never-before-seen claims easier to digest. This Court has described a
supplemental water right as "an additional appropriation of water to make up a deficiency in supply from an existing
water right." Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414,416, 18 P.3d 219,221 (2001) (Walters, J.).
If the Late Claims are intended to be supplemental water rights, they must be denied because they fail the definition
set forth in Barron-there is no deficiency in supply in the flood control years when the Late Claims are asserted to
be needed. Moreover, supplemental water rights typically are diverted from a different source when the "primary"
water rights' source is no longer available (such as in the case of"primary" surface water rights and "supplemental"
9

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ- BLACK CANYON APPEAL-NO.
13719751_1 I 30-151

44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

Page 17 of 49

First, in order to prove up a claim under the constitutional method of appropriation, the
claimant must show that the claimed water was not diverted and put to beneficial use under some
other right. Indeed, it appears that the Appellants have confessed this very point. By contending
that the Late Claims are unnecessary (because, they contend, the Storage Rights allow refill in
priority after paper fill), they have acknowledged the basic principle that one cannot obtain a
second right for diversions authorized under an existing right.
Indeed, this is an elementary point of Idaho's water law, which does not allow hoarding
or wasting of water, or the appropriation of more water than is needed to accomplish beneficial
use. Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR ("AFRD#2"), 143 Idaho 862, 880, 154 P.3d 433,
451 (2007) (Trout, J.) ("Neither the Idaho Constitution, nor statutes, permit irrigation districts
and individual water right holders to waste water or unnecessarily hoard it without putting it to
some beneficial use.") "The extent of beneficial use [is] an inherent and necessary limitation
upon the right to appropriate." Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. IDWR ("Rangen II"), 160 Idaho
119, 369 P.3d 897, 911 (2016) (quoting Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107,
117, 32 S. Ct. 470, 471 (1912)).
In short, water lawfully diverted under the decreed Storage Rights may not form the basis
for the Late Claims. As explained in Section IV.B below, Suez contends that the Storage Rights
include the ancillary right to store "excess water" without injury to other rights once the Storage
Rights have been satisfied once under priority. Thus, to prove up the Late Claims, the United
States must show that the claimed storage did not occur under the Storage Rights in priority or

ground water rights). That is not the case here. The Late Claims seek water from the very same source as the
Storage Rights, and not because that source is no longer available but because that source has too much water.
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under their ancillary entitlements to store excess water." 10 The Appellants have made no such
showing, and it is unclear how they could.
Perhaps it is theoretically possible to establish a claim such as those described in the Late
Claims, but doing so would not be easy. Unless the United States can show that the storage
claimed under the Late Claims occurred other than under Storage Rights' priority or the ancillary
right to divert excess water, what proof is there that some new right (i.e., the right asserted under
the Late Claims) was ever appropriated? There would have been no notice of such appropriation
to other water right holders. Notice is fundamental. Nielson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P.
488,490 (1911) ("the actual diversion of the water and its application to a beneficial use ...
constitutes actual notice to every intending appropriator of the water of such a stream. "). 11
Moreover, the Appellants must show that the "second fill" water was beneficially used.
In other words, did storing that water make any difference? Suppose the federal government fills
the reservoirs' 863,000 acre-feet capacity, releases 100,000 acre-feet for flood control, and then
tops off the reservoirs with 100,000 acre-feet ofrefill. If the space holders only use 600,000
acre-feet of stored water, the refill did nothing (despite potential injury to other water users). If it
is carried over, it may simply be spilled in the next year's flood control release. In other words,
the fact that reservoirs refill does not equate to beneficial use.

10 If it were possible to prove up the Late Claims on the basis of storage of water under the United States'
ancillary rights to refill with excess water, any such decrees should include provisions subordinating the rights to all
existing and future appropriations so as to give effect to the nature of the right (i.e., an appropriation that never was,
and never will be, exercised to the detriment of other valid water rights).
11 The Nielson Court also stated: "Water diverted from a stream naturally diminishes the volume. One
seeking to acquire the right to the use of water must take notice of the amount available and visible, and it must be
conclusively presumed that he inquires into the extent of the supply from which the water is to be drawn, and how
that supply has been diminished by others whose rights are prior in time." Nielson, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. at 489
(quoting with approval Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423,427 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd, 159 F. 651 (9th Cir. 1908), aff'd,
221 U.S. 485, 31 S. Ct. 703, 55 L. Ed. 821 (1911)).
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Obviously, water ostensibly stored under the Late Claims that was released for flood
control (in the same or a subsequent year) does not prove beneficial use under the Late Claims.
Moreover, simply carrying over water does not prove beneficial use. While an established
storage right may lawfully carry over reasonable amounts of unused storage, carryover storage in
itself does not demonstrate the beneficial use necessary to prove up a right. Consequently, to the
extent water could be shown to be legitimately stored under the Late Claims, it would not be
sufficient for the United States to rely on carryover as evidence that such water was beneficially
used. It must instead prove actual beneficial use of the water stored.
Finally (or perhaps initially), the Appellants must show that the additional storage under
the Late Claims was reasonable and necessary. That is, it must be shown that the United States
needed to release or bypass storable inflow available for storage under the Storage Rights since
that is the reason why the United States claims it needs to store additional water under the Late
Claims in the first place. 12 Allowing the United States to obtain additional rights to store
additional water in priority to replace water that never should have been released would reward
(and encourage) sloppy reservoir operations and waste. The United States should not be able to
obtain additional priority rights to refill an unnecessary shortfall of its own creation.
The problems with proving up the Late Claims might not be as difficult if the Late
Claims asked for second rights from a different source, or to store water in a different reservoir,
or to beneficially use water on different lands. In any of those circumstances, there would be a
clearer distinction between the Storage Rights and the Late Claims, and the evidence to prove

Concerning the standard for whether the United States needed to release water for flood control in order
to justify the Late Claims, it would seem the United States should at least have to show reasonable necessity, and
possibly strict necessity. This Court has consistently reaffirmed the State's policy against wasting water. See, e.g.,
AFRD#2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 451 ("Neither the Idaho Constitution, nor statutes, permit irrigation districts
and individual water right holders to waste water or unnecessarily hoard it without putting it to some beneficial
use.").
12
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them up likely would be more straightforward. But that is not the case here, where the Late
Claims seek to store water from the same source, in the same reservoirs, in the same total
amounts, for the same beneficial use as the Storage Rights.
The discussion above is not intended to flesh out all of the mechanics for proving up
claims such as the Late Claims. It is not Suez's burden to prove them up, it is the Appellants'
burden. There may be (likely would be) more issues to address if the merits of the Late Claims
had actually been litigated. But the Appellants did not put on any evidence to try to prove them
up, and they should not be given another chance.
Even if it could be shown that the refill was reasonable and the Late Claim water was put
to put to beneficial use, the Appellants are still not out of the woods. Whatever Late Claims
might be proven up based on pre-1971 events have been lost. With respect to the Late Claims,
perhaps the only relevant fact about the Department's current accounting system is that no
"refill" water has been stored under any priority since the Department implemented the
accounting system in 1992. If any rights to priority "refill" ever existed (and there is no evidence
they have), they were either abandoned in 1992 or have been forfeited subsequently. 13
Clearly, recognizing such priority refill rights now-rights that have never been on the
books-would diminish the priorities of junior water rights developed since 1992. Because
those junior rights are entitled to have the system maintained as it existed when their rights were
appropriated, any right to refill in priority (whether in the Storage Rights or in the Late Claims)
would have to be subordinated to existing juniors.

13 If the Appellants believe they are insufficiently protected by the existing rights to store extra water
during free river conditions, they could file a new permit application for an additional right. Doing so would protect
juniors who have acquired rights under the existing regime (i.e., in a system where priority refill rights have never
been on the books), would put everyone on notice, and allow the Department to determine whether and under what
conditions to issue a permit and later a license.
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Before closing on this subject, it bears emphasis that there is no need for this Court to
address how one proves up a late claim for storage refill. That is a complicated subject, and
there are ample reasons not to go there-notably res judicata and the failure of the Appellants to
present anything approaching meaningful proof. Rather, this discussion is included to address
the obvious question of what should happen if this Court does not agree with the SRBA Court
that the Late Claims are barred by the Payette Adjudication. In short, the Late Claims would
have to be remanded to the SRBA Court so the Appellants could attempt to clear the many
evidentiary hurdles on their path to proving up these unique claims.

Ill.

THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE WHETHER
STORAGE RIGHTS INCLUDE PRIORITY REFILL ENTITLEMENTS (AS EXPLAINED
BELOW THEY DO NOT).

Instead of offering evidence to prove up the Late Claims, the Appellants contend that the
Late Claims are "unnecessary" because, in their view, the Storage Rights should be interpreted as
including priority refill entitlements. USA Brief at 40; BCID Brief at 24-30. Section IV of this
brief addresses why that contention is wrong. This Section III addresses why these proceedings
on the Late Claims are not the proper avenue for re-defining or re-interpreting the nature or
extent of the Storage Rights or addressing how they should be administered.
This Court should affirm the SRBA Court's holding that this is not the proper proceeding
to address the scope or administration of the Storage Rights. Simply put, the Late Claims are not
about the nature or extent of the Storage Rights. That ship sailed more than a decade ago when
the SRBA Court issued the Storage Rights' partial decrees. If one needs to understand what the
Storage Rights mean in order to determine the validity, nature or extent of the Late Claims, one
need look no further than the face of their decrees, which contain no priority refill entitlements.
The United States' and Black Canyon's attempts to re-examine the nature and extent of the
Storage Rights calls into question the finality and conclusiveness of all SRBA partial decrees.
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This appeal also is not about the administration of the Storage Rights' decrees-that is
the Director ofIDWR's duty (which is subject to judicial oversight but not in these Late Claims
proceedings). The pending Basin 63 appeals are the appropriate proceedings to review whether
the Director is correctly interpreting and administering federal on-stream storage rights' decrees
according to Idaho law.

A.

The Storage Rights' decrees issued more than a decade ago
unambiguously define their nature and extent.

"Idaho courts interpret water decrees using the same interpretation rules that apply to
contracts." Rangen, Inc. v. IDWR ("Rangen F'), 159 Idaho 798,367 P.3d 193,202 (2016) (J.
Jones, C.J.). The "proper analysis is to look first only to the four comers of the divorce
decree..... The court's inquiry will move beyond the four comers of the decree ... only when
the decree is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations." Barley v.

Smith, 149 Idaho 171,177,233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010) (J. Jones, J.).
There is no ambiguity in the Storage Rights' decrees, so there is no reason to look beyond
their four comers to determine what they mean. Each of the decrees clearly states the maximum
annual volume of water allowed to be diverted into storage under the right' s priority date. And
that is all they say. They do not authorize flood control as a beneficial use or otherwise. There is
no provision for refill and no special rule or remark saying that water released or bypassed for
flood control does not count toward the authorized quantity. Accordingly, there is no reason to
read these provisions into the rights.
Thus, to the extent it is necessary to understand the nature and extent of the Storage
Rights to decide the Late Claims, the Court need look no further than the face of the decrees. 14

As discussed in Section IV below, even if the Storage Rights' decrees were ambiguous (which they are
not), neither Idaho Jaw nor the evidence in this case provide a basis for finding a priority refill entitlement associated
with the Storage Rights.
14
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B.

The Storage Rights' decrees are final and should not be subject to
collateral attack in these Late Claims proceedings.

The Storage Rights were partially decreed almost a decade ago. R. at 543-57. They were
incorporated by reference into the SRBA Court's Final Unified Decree, 15 which is "binding
against all persons," R. at 841, and "conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights
within the Snake River Basin within the State of Idaho with a priority date prior to November 19,
1987 ...." R. at 839. "By statute, 'decree[s] entered in a general adjudication shall be
conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system.'"
Rangen I, 159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 200 (quoting LC.§ 42-1420(1)). The decrees were not
appealed or set aside, and the SRBA Court did not retain jurisdiction over them in its Pending
Subcases Order. See footnote 15 above. Simply put, the Storage Rights have been fully
adjudicated. They were not re-opened and their nature and extent are not at issue in these
subcases.
"Generally, final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack."
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,894,277 P.3d 337,341 (2012) (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted). 16 This Court has held that a water rights decree is "conclusive proof
of diversion of the water, and of application of the water to beneficial use, i.e., the decree is res
judicata as to the water rights at issue [in a subsequent proceeding]." Crow v. Carlson, 107

15 The SRBA Court issued its Final Unified Decree in 2014, and the Storage Rights were not included in
the list of claims over which the court retained jurisdiction R. at 840 (Final Unified Decree); R. at 859-60 (Order
Regarding Subcases Pending Upon Entry ofFinal Unified Decree, the "Pending Subcases Order'). Claim numbers
listed in the Pending Subcases Order were excepted from the Final Unified Decree so they could continue to be
processed. The Late Claims were included in the Pending Subcases Order, but the Storage Rights' partial decrees
were not.

16 The SRBA Court has consistently held that "a party cannot have its water use adjudicated or
administratively determined in one proceeding and then re-adjudicate the right under a more favorable legal theory
in a subsequent proceeding." BCID BriefApp. 2 at 16 (Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment re: Bureau ofReclamation Streamflow Maintenance Claim ("Lucky Peak Order") at 16,
Subcase No. 63-03618 (Sept. 28, 2008)).
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Idaho 461,465,690 P.2d 916,920 (1984), quoted in Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit
Co., 158 Idaho 269,277,346 P.3d 286,294 (2015). The Crow Court's "holding of the

presumption of accuracy of the decree is in keeping with the judicial policy of deterring the
reopening of judgments long after cases are decided and the files are closed." Id.
The time to determine the nature and extent of the Storage Rights-including whether
they include any priority refill entitlements-was before their partial decrees were issued. The
Storage Rights' partial decrees contain all of their elements and any remarks and other matters
necessary for definition of the rights, for clarification of any element of the rights, or for
administration of the rights by the Director. Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) ("The district court shall
enter a partial decree determining the nature and extent of the water right .... "); Idaho Code§
42-1411(2) (describing elements, remarks, and other matters to be included in partial decrees). If
the United States or Black Canyon believed the Storage Rights included a right to refill under
priority after stored or storable water is vacated or released for flood control, they could have and
should have attempted to have such elements or remarks included in the decrees. See Rangen I,
159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 201 ("If Rangen wanted its water rights to be interpreted
differently, it should have timely asserted that in the SRBA."). But they made no such attempt,
and the decrees contain no such elements or remarks. No timely or appropriate procedural
mechanism has been used to request re-interpretation of the Storage Rights here.
Now the Appellants want to undo their earlier oversight (intentional or not) by
challenging the decreed Storage Rights' nature and scope in these Late Claims proceedings.
This strategy constitutes an improper attempt to re-adjudicate the Storage Rights under a new
legal theory the Appellants find more favorable. But the Court should not indulge them. As the
SRBA Court has stated, "[t]he late claim procedure was not intended to give claimants a second
bite at the apple." R. at 356.
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There is no merit to the Appellants contention that the property rights defined by the
Storage Rights' partial decrees are subject to interpretation in these Late Claim proceedings.
See, e.g., BCID Brief at 21 ("interpretation of the [Storage Rights] partial decrees against the
legal backdrop of federal flood control operations is not a collateral attack on the existing partial
decrees." (emphasis in original)). Disputing the "interpretation" of partial decrees rather than the
partial decrees themselves is a "distinction without a difference." Rangen I, 159 Idaho at_,
367 P.3d at 201. Any "interpretation" of the Storage Rights' partial decrees cannot be
inconsistent with their plain language. Id. ("Any interpretation of ... partial decrees that is
inconsistent with their plain language would necessarily impact the certainty and finality of
SRBA judgments .... "). 17
In sum, the Storage Rights contain no mention of any priority refill entitlements now
sought by the Appellants, and that "cannot be disputed due to the SRBA partial decrees."
Mullinix, 158 Idaho at 278, 346 P.3d at 295. Accordingly, the Appellants are precluded from relitigating that issue.
C.

The Director of IDWR has the duty and discretion to administer the
Storage Rights according to their decrees and Idaho law.

This Court has held that the Director of IDWR has the duty and discretion to determine
how water should be counted toward the "fill" or "satisfaction" of the Storage Rights and in
accordance with their decrees and Idaho law. Whether the Director's methodology is a lawful
exercise of his discretion is at issue in the Basin 63 appeals. That is the proper proceeding for
answering the "refill" question, not this one.

17 The Ran gen I Court pointed out that any interpretation of partial decrees inconsistent with their plain
language "needed to be made in the SRBA itself." Rangen I, 159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 201. This, of course,
implies the appropriate procedural mechanism is used, or else such an inconsistent interpretation would run afoul of
the other judicial doctrines already discussed, such as res judicata and interpreting unambiguous court decrees by
looking within their four comers.
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Citing the Director's authority over this question, the SRBA Court in the Basin Wide
Issue 17 proceeding declined to address "the issue of when the quantity element of a storage
water right is rightfully considered to be 'filled' or 'satisfied."' R. at 887. The SRBA Court
explained:
[A ]ddressing the issue of fill may require factual inquiries,
investigation and record development specific to a given reservoir
and the water right or rights associated with the reservoir.
Addressing the issue of fill will require a record as to how the
Department accounts for fill in each individual reservoir under its
accounting methodology....
Furthermore, the authority and responsibility for measuring
and distributing water to and among appropriators is statutorily
conferred to, and vested in, the Idaho Department of Water
Resources and its Director....
The Director has the authority and discretion to determine
how water from a natural water source is distributed to storage
water rights pursuant to accounting methodologies he employs.
The Director's discretion in this respect is not unbridled, but rather
is subject to state law and oversight by the courts. When review of
the Director's discretion in this respect is brought before the courts
in an appropriate proceeding, and upon a properly developed
record, the courts can determine whether the Director has properly
exercised his discretion regarding accounting methodologies.
R. at 887-88. See also R. at 885 (SRBA Court's footnote 6 stating that "the Department utilizes
an accounting methodology for the purpose of determining when a storage water right has been
'filled.' ... [T]he Department's accounting methodology is an administrative function which
should be addressed on a case-by-case basis on a fully developed factual record and where the
Department is a party to the proceeding."). 18

18

The SRBA Court reached similar conclusions in its order designating Basin-Wide Issue No. 17:

An on-stream reservoir alters the stream affecting the administration of all rights on the
source. Accordingly, some methodology is required to implement priority administration of
affected rights. Addressing the issue of reservoir fill may require factual inquiries, investigation
and record development specific to a given reservoir, including how the State accounts for fill in
each individual reservoir under its accounting program. As stated above, such factually specific
inquiries do not lend themselves to review in a basin-wide setting involving multiple reservoirs.
Furthermore, unlike the issue of priority refill which is directly related to the quantity element of a
water right, the issue of fill is purely an issue of administration.
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This Court agreed and also declined to decide how water should be counted toward the
fill of a water right. "Nor will this Court answer that question on appeal." BW 17, 157 Idaho at
392,336 P.3d at 799. This Court also agreed that the question must be answered by the Director:
"That statute gives the Director a clear legal duty to distribute water. However, the details of the
performance of the duty are left to the director's discretion." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 393,336 P.3d
at 800 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Once partial decrees are issued, Idaho law provides that the Director of ID WR-not the
SRBA Court or any court-has the sole duty and authority to distribute water accordingly. Idaho
Code§ 42-602 "require[s] the Director to interpret ... partial decrees." Rangen I, 159 Idaho at
_ , 367 P.3d at 204.
The decrees give the Director a quantity he must provide to each
water user in priority. In other words, the decree is a property right
to a certain amount of water: a number that the Director must fill
in priority to that user. However, it is within the Director's
discretion to determine when that number has been met for each
individual decree.

BW 17, 157 Idaho at 394,336 P.3d at 801.
The Director initiated the administrative proceeding at issue in the Basin 63 appeals "[t]o
address and resolve concerns with and/or objections to how water is counted or credited toward
the fill of water rights for the federal on-stream reservoirs pursuant to existing procedures of
accounting in Water District 63." R. at 1507. See also Addendum to US Brief, Tab 2, p. 2. 19 As
predicted by the SRBA Court in the quote above, R. at 887-88, that administrative proceeding
produced a record as to how the Department accounts for fill in the Boise River reservoirs under

BW I 7, 157 Idaho at 388-89, 336 P.3d at 795-96 (quoting SRBA Court; emphasis added).
19 Tab 2 of the Addendum to US Brief is a copy of the SRBA Court's Memorandum Decision and Order in
Ballentyne Ditch Co. et al. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, Case No. CV-WA-2015-21376 (Idaho 4th Dist.)
(Sept. 1, 2016), the decision at issue in the Basin 63 appeals.
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its accounting methodology, including factual inquiries, investigation and record development
specific to the Boise River reservoirs and the decreed water rights associated with them. The
Director's decision in that proceeding, based on its fully developed record, is before this Court in
the Basin 63 appeals. As the United States points out, because the Department's Basin 63 and
Basin 65 accounting systems use similar principles for accruing water to federal on-stream
reservoirs, the outcome of the Basin 63 appeals may affect Basin 65 water rights accounting.
Thus, the Basin 63 appeals are the proceeding where this Court has said the issue of determining
on-stream reservoir fill should be determined. Not here.
IV.

THE STORAGE RIGHTS DO NOT INCLUDE PRIORITY REFILL ENTITLEMENTS, BUT
IDAHO'S PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE NEVERTHELESS AUTHORIZES
SECOND FILL WITH "EXCESS WATER" SO LONG AS OTHER RIGHTS ARE NOT
HARMED.

Appellants argue that the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements, and ask this
Court to make that determination. US Brief at 43 ("this Court should ... , in the alternative,
affirm the district court on the grounds that the decreed rights for Cascade and Deadwood
Reservoirs enable the United States to fill the reservoirs up to the decreed amounts after releases
for flood-control purposes")2°; BCID Brief at 40 ("BCID respectfully requests that this Court
review and adopt the Special Master's reasoning and conclusions of law addressing the flood
control effect question as its own."). 21 As explained above in Section III, this is not the right
proceeding to make that determination.

20 The United States' statement fails to mention whether the relief sought includes rights to refill under
priority after flood control releases. Presumably it does. If not, there is no dispute because Suez believes the United
States' Storage Rights include entitlements to fill the reservoirs with excess water up to the decreed amounts
following flood control releases so long as no other water rights are harmed (i.e., not under a right of priority).
21 Black Canyon's reference to the "Special Master's reasoning and conclusions oflaw" presumably refers
to the Special Master's holding that the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements. As described by Black
Canyon, "Special Master Booth held, consistent with BCID's arguments, that the late claims should be disallowed
on the additional basis that the water claimed by them was not subject to appropriation because it 'had already been
appropriated through the existing storage rights' for the Reservoirs (i&.... the late claims were not necessary because
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If, however, the Court finds that it should in this proceeding reach the question of

whether the Storage Rights include a right to refill under priority, it should rule that no such right
exists. As explained in Section IV.B below, the United States may refill its reservoirs with
"excess water" so long as other rights are not injured (i.e., refill may occur, but not under
priority). 22 This is all the United States is entitled to under the Storage Rights and Idaho's Prior
Appropriation Doctrine, and this is all that it needs.
As Suez has urged throughout these proceedings, the Basin 63 proceedings, and the Basin
Wide 17 proceedings, Idaho law must adhere to one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill principles
when water is distributed to on-stream reservoir water rights such as the Storage Rights. Indeed,
the SRBA Court agreed that the incorporation of these principles in the Department's accounting
is consistent with Idaho law. Addendum to US Brief, Tab 2, p.7-14. Of course, the SRBA
Court's affirmation of those principles is squarely at issue in the Basin 63 appeals, and those are
the appropriate proceedings to address such issues. Suez will address those principles, and the
Storage Rights' entitlements to divert excess water, fully in its briefing in the Basin 63
proceedings but, given the arguments made by the Appellants in these Basin 65 appeals, feels
compelled to address them here as well.
A.

The Storage Rights are entitled to one fill under priority based on the
amount of storable inflow entering the reservoirs.

The SRBA Court held in its Basin-Wide Issue 17 decision:
Simply stated, under Idaho's doctrine of prior appropriation a
senior storage holder may not fill or satisfy his water right multiple
times, under priority, before rights held by affected junior
the existing storage rights already authorized one physical fill of the reservoirs despite flood control releases in flood
control years)." BCID Brief at 6.
22 As discussed in Part IV.B below, "excess water" exists above and beyond all water rights, the diversion
of which is lawful because (by definition) no other water right holder is entitled to that "excess water" at that time.
Thus, diversion not under priority with "excess water" is in contrast to diversion under priority.
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appropriators are satisfied once.
R. at 886 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 10). Put another way, "[t]he assertion that a senior storage
right holder can 'fill,' or 'satisfy,' his water right multiple times under priority before an affected
junior water right is satisfied once is contrary to the prior appropriation doctrine as established
under Idaho law." R. at 885 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 9). Suez refers to this principle as the
"one-fill" rule.
On appeal, this Court did not address whether the SRBA Court was correct in
recognizing the one-fill rule, although it did state that the question it answered was "relatively
straightforward." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 392,336 P.3d at 799.
Indeed, it is straightforward. It is mandated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine.
Under Idaho law, multiple fills of a water right, under right of priority, would be an enlargement
of a water right, and this Court has held that enlargement constitutes per se injury. "An increase
in the volume of water diverted is an enlargement .... " City ofPocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho
830,835,275 P.3d 845, 850 (2012) (Eismann, J.) (quoting Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist.

and Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454,458,926 P.2d
1301, 1305 (1996) (Schroeder, J.)). "[T]here is per se injury to junior water rights holders
anytime an enlargement receives priority. Priority in time is an essential part of western water
law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right holder." Id.
(citation omitted). See also Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414,420, 18
P.3d 219,225 (2001) (Walters, J.) ("Enlargement includes increasing the amount of water
diverted or consumed to accomplish the beneficial use.").
To avoid enlarging the Storage Rights in violation of the one-fill rule, all legally and
physically available water must be counted toward their satisfaction. Suez calls this the "storable
inflow" principle. The storable inflow principle requires that if water is coming into a reservoir
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and is "in priority" to the associated storage water right, it counts towards the fill of the storage
right. The term "in priority" simply means that it is legally available to store, i.e., is not required
to be bypassed for delivery to a downstream senior.
In short, if water is physically and legally available to store, the storage right holder is
expected to store it. If a storage right holder decides not to store storable inflow, or stores it and
later releases some of it-for whatever reason-that does not reduce or otherwise affect the
right's accrued fill. The right holder may not say, "Well, I think I'll just let this water pass and
then take my single fill later."
The storable inflow principle works in conjunction with the "paper fill" concept to give
effect to the one-fill rule. Counting all "storable inflow" toward fill of a storage water right is
frequently described as "paper fill"-a term perhaps coined by the Department when it
implemented its computerized accounting systems, but that nonetheless is required by Idaho's
Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 23
"Paper fill" captures two points: (1) all storable inflow counts toward filling the right,
whether it is captured or not, and (2) releasing previously captured water does not reduce the
accrued fill. Thus, once sufficient storable inflow (i.e., legally and physically available water)
reaches the reservoir to satisfy the quantity element of the on-stream storage right, the right is
considered satisfied and has been filled on paper (i.e., it has achieved paper fill).
As will be discussed below, the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill rules properly
enforce the Storage Rights' quantity and priority elements, assure junior water rights receive
water at the times and in the amounts they are entitled to, promote the maximum use and least

23 Throughout this brief, the term "paper fill" is not used as an accounting term, but rather as shorthand for
the principle that one fill of a storage right has occurred under the storable inflow principle. Although the one fill,
storable inflow, and paper fill principles are incorporated into the Department's accounting system, they are not
merely accounting principles. Rather, they are mandated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine.
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wasteful use of Idaho's water resources, and protect the State of Idaho's control over the
distribution of its public waters. In contrast, the Appellants' suggestion that the Storage Rights
include priority refill entitlements in wholly inconsistent with Idaho's Prior Appropriation
Doctrine.
(1)

The essential elements of priority date and quantity must be
given effect.

Together, the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill principles operate to enforce what
this Court has called "the essential elements of priority date and quantity" 24 and to prevent
impermissible enlargement of the Storage Rights' elements by limiting priority diversions to the
decreed quantities (i.e., volumes) of the water rights. This Court has not had occasion to deal
with the quantity issue in the context of storage refill. But it has been clear enough on the
fundamental principle that quantity matters and that "vague and fluctuating" quantities do not fit
under the Prior Appropriation Doctrine.
This Court has imposed the measurement requirement as a
corollary to the basic policy of the conservation of water resources
for beneficial use. [Citing the Idaho Constitution and Water
Code.] The Court has required such a measurement when the
decree is intended to settle the rights of various appropriators who
claim and use fluctuating amounts of water from the same source.
Thus, if the decree awards an uncertain amount of water to one
appropriator whose needs are vague and fluctuating, it is likely that
he will waste water and yet have the power to prevent others from
putting the surplus to any beneficial use. [Reference to cases
rejecting decrees for unspecified amounts.] The practice
condemned by these cases was not simply the issuance of
unmeasured decrees but that of awarding to one competing
appropriator more water than he could beneficially use. These
cases express a policy against waste irrespective of the technical
legal error found to have permitted it.

24

State ofIdaho v. Idaho Conservation League ("!CL If'), 131 Idaho 329, 333, 955 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1998)

(Silak, J.).
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Village ofPeck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 750-51, 450 P.2d 310, 313-14 (1969) (McQuade, J.)

(emphasis added).
That hits the nail on the head. If the federal government is allowed to store, release, and
store again more water than it takes to reach the Storage Rights' authorized quantities, it will
have stored more water than it can beneficially use, and it is "likely that that [it] will waste water
and yet have the power to prevent others from putting the surplus to any beneficial use." Id.
The United States correctly recognizes that the storable inflow and paper fill principles
consider the Bureau as storing water towards the Storage Rights' satisfaction "even when
Reclamation is physically lowering or simply maintaining reservoir levels." USA Brief at 40. As
well it should! To do otherwise would be contrary to Idaho law by allowing the storage of more
water than authorized under the Storage Rights' partial decrees.
Take, for example, the Bureau's Cascade and Deadwood reservoirs, whose water rights
total 863,000 acre-feet. Say the Bureau physically stored 600,000 acre-feet, and later vacated
100,000 acre-feet of that stored water for flood control. If the Bureau was then allowed to
physically refill the 100,000 acre-feet and also physically fill the remainder of the 863,000 acrefeet of total reservoir space (i.e., the remaining 363,000 acre-feet), the total amount physically
stored during this year would be 1,063,000 acre-feet (600,000 + 363,000 + 100,000 =
1,063,000). In other words, by storing that 100,000 acre-foot block twice, the Bureau would
exceed the total authorized volume of storage allowed under the Storage Rights. Thus, if the
Bureau could physically store water under the Storage Rights' priority without counting it as
water stored under the rights' priority, there would be no limit to how much water it could store
under priority.
The unlimited ability to satisfy a water right would be deeply problematical for Idaho's
water law, particularly with respect to on-stream reservoirs. Unlike natural flow water rights and
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off-stream storage rights, which are limited to diversions based on flow rates (cfs), the Storage
Rights' quantity elements are described in terms of annual volume only, with no flow rate
limitations. The lack of flow rate limitations in the Storage Rights' decrees is not an oversight or
an ambiguity. The Storage Rights purposely-and prudently-were decreed with no flow limit
so they could capture all of the Payette River's available flows while the rights were in priority.
In other words, these on-stream rights authorize the federal government to control every drop of
water in the river-but only when they are in priority during a single fill. This maximizes the
potential the reservoirs will fill completely and do so at a time least in conflict with other water
users. This makes more water available for juniors and maximizes the use of the State's water
resources.
Thus, when the Storage Rights are in priority, the federal government is entitled (and
incentivized) to store all stream flow entering the reservoir that is not required to be delivered to
senior water rights. Juniors are not entitled to call for water until the Storage Rights' decreed
volumes have been satisfied (i.e., "paper fill" has been achieved).
Contrary to Black Canyon's contentions, 25 considering the Storage Rights satisfied based
on their respective reservoirs' maximum physical fill would violate the Storage Rights' quantity
elements. It is no limit at all to measure the satisfaction of an on-stream storage right (whose
quantity is defined only as an annual volume limit) by the amount of water in the reservoir on the
day of maximum physical fill. The decree might as well read, "Take and release all the water
you want, whenever you want, and always take it priority until there is no more water to take."
Such an unlimited right, exercised in priority, would enable the reservoir operator-in this case

See, e.g., BCID Brief at 18 (arguing that the Storage Rights included the water "physically present in the
Reservoirs at the point of maximum physical fill").
25
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the federal government-to control the entire river (except for the rights senior to the Storage
Rights).
The Appellants also contend that flood releases do not count toward fill because flood
releases are not beneficial uses. 26 They are correct that beneficial use is a fundamental
prerequisite in the creation and continued existence of any water right, but it has nothing to do
with the accrual of water to an on-stream storage right. If a water right holder does not
beneficially use the water distributed to it, that holder may suffer consequences. But it does not
change the fact that the distribution of water has been made.
The Storage Rights' decrees include no flood control exceptions to their quantity
elements. Accordingly, if the storage right holders release stored or storable water-whether for
beneficial uses or not-they must allow other water users to fill their rights before taking a
second fill of the storage rights. This might sound harsh, but that is how the prior appropriation
doctrine works when water is scarce. 27 It does not allow "do-overs" when a user wastes the
water to which they are legally entitled. The storable inflow and paper fill principles represent
strict enforcement of the quantity and priority date elements, not the reservoir owner-friendly
"discretion" advocated by the Appellants.
The United States' and Black Canyon's beneficial use arguments do not address the fact
that water stored, but later spilled for flood control, must count toward the satisfaction of a
storage right. The reason is simple. The Department's distribution of water to various water
rights has nothing to do with beneficial use. Applying water to beneficial use (or otherwise

26 See, e.g., US Brief at 41 ("waters stored and released solely for flood-control purposes are not
appropriations"); BCID Brief at 14 (stating that flood control releases are not beneficial uses of water, and that such
releases frustrate the purpose of a storage water right).

"These principles [of the prior appropriation doctrine] become even more difficult, and harsh, in their
application in times of drought." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440
(2007) (Trout, J.).
27
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releasing it, such as for flood control) is the business and concern of the storage right holder. It
is not a factor in distribution or in determining fill of a storage water right. Once water is
distributed to a right holder, that person may release it to irrigate crops (a beneficial use), to
irrigate rocks (a waste of water that could lead to forfeiture), or to vacate space to capture
predicted flood waters (a potentially reasonable and lawful but nevertheless non-beneficial use
under the decreed storage rights28). None of these actions-which occur at some point after the
distribution of water-has any bearing on the quantity of water that person is entitled to receive
under priority. The water right holder is not entitled to a second helping at the expense of juniors
if they fail to apply their first helping to an authorized beneficial use-no matter what the reason.
(2)

Junior water rights are entitled to protection.

Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine protects not only the senior's right against
interference by juniors. It also protects the junior's right to be shielded from wrongful or
wasteful acts that effectively enlarge the rights of seniors. "Priority in time is an essential part of
western water law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right
holder." Jenkins v. State, Dept. o/Water Res., 103 Idaho 384,388,647 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1982).
"[T]here is per se injury to junior water rights holders anytime an enlargement receives priority.
Priority in time is an essential part of western water law and to diminish one's priority works an
undeniable injury to that water right holder." Id. ( citation omitted). See also Van Camp v.
Emery, 13 Idaho 202,208, 89 P. 752, 754 (1907) (holding that a senior may divert the quantity

of water to which he is entitled to in priority but after filling the right once, may not "hinder or
impede the flow of the remaining stream" to the junior); City ofPocatello, 152 Idaho at 835, 275
P.3d at 850 ("An increase in the volume of water diverted is an enlargement .... "). Any

If reasonably compelled by the need to prevent flooding, such releases presumably would be protected
from forfeiture under Idaho Code§ 42-223(6), but this question is not before the Court.
28
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contention that the Storage Rights may be filled multiple times under right of priority cannot be
reconciled with these foundational principles of water law. As the SRBA Court held: "[U]nder
the prior appropriation doctrine as established under Idaho law, a senior storage right holder may
not refill his storage water right under priority before junior appropriators satisfy their water
rights once." R. at 889 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 13).

(3)

Idaho law and policy requires the maximum use of the State's
water resources.

The storable inflow and paper fill principles also are necessary to ensure "the maximum
use and benefit, and least wasteful use ofldaho's water resources." Idaho Ground Water Assoc.

v. IDWR ("Rangen IF'), 160 Idaho 119, 129,369 P.3d 897, 907 (2016) (J. Jones, C.J.); Kunz v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 904, 792 P .2d 926, 929 ( 1990) (Bakes, J. ). These
principles require on-stream storage right holders to store all water that is legally and physically
available until their decreed volumes are met, or else suffer the consequences if they choose
otherwise. If they are not held to this standard, water that could and should have been stored will
flow downstream in quantities and at times when other users do not expect it and cannot use it,
and then reservoirs will be filled later with water that other users are expecting.
It has long been the law in Idaho that a senior may not take his water inefficiently so as to
deprive others:
In this arid country, where the largest duty and the greatest
use must be had from every inch of water in the interest of
agriculture and home building, it will not do to say that a stream
may be dammed so as to cause subirrigation of a few acres at a loss
of enough water to surface irrigate 10 times as much by proper
application.

Van Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202,202, 89 P. 752, 752 (1907) (Ailshie, C.J.).
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schodde v. Twin Falls Water Co., 224 U.S. 107
(1912), held that that there is "no right under the constitution and laws of the State ofldaho to
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appropriate the current of the river so as to render it impossible for others to apply the otherwise
unappropriated waters of the river to beneficial uses." Schodde, 224 U.S. at 117 (1912). The

Schodde Court cited one of its earlier cases in concluding that a water right "must be exercised
with reference to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the people, and not
so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or community of its use and vest an absolute monopoly in
a single individual." Schodde, 224 U.S. at 121 (quoting Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 683,
87 U.S. 670,683 (1874)).
In the same year as Schodde, this Court held that extending priority to "all the waters that
flow" during the high runoff period is contrary to the constitutional principle that right to
appropriate unappropriated flows may never be denied:
To say that the respondents are entitled to all the waters that flow
in the stream, when there is more water flowing at some seasons of
the year than respondents are able to divert and apply to a
beneficial use, would deny the right of appropriation by any other
person, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents were not
diverting or applying the excess to a beneficial use.

Lee v. Hanford, 21 Idaho 327, 331, 121 P. 558, 560 (1912) (Stewart, C.J.).
Citing nearly a century of precedent, this Court observed in 1990: "The policy of the law
of this State is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water
resources." Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 904, 792 P.2d 926, 929 (1990)
(Bakes, J.).
In 2011, this Court reiterated the State's longstanding commitment to this principle:
In Niday v. Barker, 16 Idaho 73, 79, 101 P. 254, 256
( 1909), we stated, "The theory of the law is that the public waters
of this state shall be subjected to the highest and greatest duty." In
Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irrigation District,
Ltd., 16 Idaho 525,535, 102 P. 481,483 (1909), we phrased it,
"Economy must be required and demanded in the use and
application of water." In Poole v. 0/aveson, 82 Idaho 496, 502,
356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960), we expressed the same concept by stating,
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"The policy of the law of this State is to secure the maximum use
and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water resources."

Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,808,252 P.3d 71, 89 (2011) (Eismann,
C.J.).
And, just last year, this Court again reinforced this principle: "As we recently stated in

Clear Springs, the policy of securing the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use of
Idaho's water resources, has long been the policy in Idaho." Rangen 11, 160 Idaho at 129,369
P .3d at 907. This Court also explained that Schodde is not just about a reasonable means of
diversion. It established a general principle of maximum beneficial use:
[T]he principles stated in Schodde apply equally in this water
management case where the senior appropriator seeks to assert
control over practically the entire aquifer, regardless of the
minimal benefit to the senior and the great detriment to the juniors.

Rangen II, 160 Idaho at 133, 369 P.3d at 911.
This maximum use principle is of great import here. By their very nature, on-stream
reservoirs control the entire river. That control is reflected on the face of the associated storage
right in that, unlike other rights, they are decreed with no instantaneous flow limit. The only
quantity limit is their annual volume. Thus, they may take every drop of water when they are in
priority. This unique quantity limitation gives storage rights both the ability and the obligation to
capture all legally available water when they can, as early in the accounting year as possible.
This Court has recognized that storage rights are different than natural flow rights.
There is a fundamental difference with regard to the
diversion and use of water from a flowing stream and a reservoir.
In a stream if a user does not take out his water, it may be diverted
by the other appropriators, because otherwise it flows on and is
dissipated. But the very purpose of storage is to retain and hold for
subsequent use, direct or augmentary, hence retention is not of
itself illegal nor does it deprive the user of the right to continue to
hold.
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Rayl v. Salmon River Canal Co., 66 Idaho 199,208, 157 P.2d 76, 80 (1945) (Givens, J.). The

SRBA Court also has recognized this difference: "An on-stream reservoir alters the stream
affecting the administration of all rights on the source." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 388, 336 P .3d at
795 (quoting SRBA Court).
These fundamental attributes of storage rights require the conclusion that an on-stream
reservoir operator may not fill its reservoir at the operator's convenience. Idaho's Prior
Appropriation Doctrine expects the holders of the Storage Rights (which authorize storage for
beneficial uses and do not include flood control) to store as much water was possible when it is
available. Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 91, 558 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1977) ("the entire
water distribution system under Title 42 of the Idaho Code is to further the State's policy of
securing the maximum use and benefit of its water resources."). To the extent possible, this
should happen before or early in the irrigation season when plenty of water is available. When
storable inflow is released or bypassed during these periods, it rarely provides benefit to
downstream holders of water rights (most of whom desire diversions during the irrigation
season), and the water flows irretrievably out-of-state.
(4)

The State of Idaho must retain control over the distribution of
water.

The United States contends that the Bureau must have "discretion to determine how and
when to impound flows in satisfaction of its storage rights .... " US Brief at 41. It already has
that discretion when its rights are in priority or when there is "excess water" in the river.
However, the degree of discretion sought by the United States-to take a second fill to the
detriment of other users-would take away the Director's authority under Idaho Code 42-602 to
administer the State's public waters in the Payette River according to the Storage Rights' stated
quantities. The proposal would impermissibly allow the federal government to take any quantity
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it chooses, thereby vitiating the quantity element of their decreed rights, blocking future
appropriations, and effectively abdicating State control to the federal reservoir operators.
Because high flows simply are unappropriated waters, the approach urged by the
Appellants would effectively give the federal government a priority entitlement to all of the
unappropriated waters in the streams harnessed by Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs. But the
federal government has no right to prevent future appropriations. Idaho Const. art. 15, § 3 ("The
right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses,
shall never be denied"); Parker v. Wallentine, l 03 Idaho 506, 513, 650 P.2d 648, 655 (1982)
("The right to appropriate unappropriated water is guaranteed by article XV, section 3 of the
Idaho Constitution").
The Appellants improperly conflate reservoir operations and water rights. 29 The United
States has and will continue to have control over its reservoir operations. Like any dam operator,
it has the authority (and the duty) to bypass or release water to in the interest of downstream
flood control. 30 But that has no bearing on when its water rights are filled or how the State
distributes water.

29 The United States says that "Reclamation treated flood control to be independent of the water rights
system and prior appropriation." US Briefat 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps so. But the
Reclamation Act of 1902-the law under which Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs were constructed, US Brief at
10-requires that the federal government defer to Idaho's laws "relating to the control, appropriation, use, [and]
distribution of water ...." 43 U.S.C. § 383 (Sec. 8 of Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388). Again, whether the Late
Claims could be proven up, or whether the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements, is a question ofldaho
water law. Thus, the federal government may operate its reservoirs however it pleases but, as required by the
Reclamation Act, the storage of water for beneficial use (i.e., the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of
water) is dictated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine.

30 Idaho's common law of torts imposes obligations on dam owners, and the federal government may pose
further and more stringent duties on its own facilities, but these are not obligations imposed by the prior
appropriation doctrine or the Storage Rights' decrees. The Bureau's release of water stored for beneficial use is
found in the federal policies that provide for the Payette River reservoirs to be operated in part for flood control, and
also in Idaho's common law that requires all reservoir owners to operate reasonably. Burgess v. Salmon River
Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299,305, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1991) ("we conclude that there is a similar duty of
reasonableness upon the operator of a dam who, once having impeded the flow of a natural stream by impounding it
in a reservoir, thereby exercising control of the flow of the water in the stream, subsequently discharges water from
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The key distinction that must be made is that the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill
principles-and the quantity element of a storage water right-have nothing to do with whether
reservoirs are actually physically full. These principles-and Idaho's Prior Appropriation
Doctrine in general-are concerned with water rights, not reservoir operations (which are not
dictated by Idaho law and, in this case, are at the federal government's discretion).
The federal government's reservoir operations do not define the scope or administration
of the Storage Rights or Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. The Storage Rights, in fact,
authorize only storage and beneficial uses from storage. Neither they nor Idaho's water law
authorizes flood control or any other reservoir operations inconsistent with those decreed
purposes.
Physical fill is simply a function of reservoir operations-operations that are controlled
by the federal government in the case of the Boise River reservoirs. It is not a water right
concept, and it has nothing to do with accounting for the fill of the Storage Rights. Likewise,
paper fill based on storable inflow has nothing to do with whether a reservoir is actually
physically filled. It is a principle necessary for the proper administration of on-stream storage
water rights under Idaho law.
The corollary to this is that achieving paper fill means that sufficient storable inflow has
reached the reservoirs to satisfy the water right and completely fill the reservoirs. Thus, if
complete paper fill is achieved, any failure to physically fill the reservoirs results from the
federal reservoir operators' operational decisions, such as deciding to bypass or release water for
flood control (or for some other federal objective). No one but the federal government controls
the timing or quantity of flood control releases (or any other operational decisions for that

the reservoir into the natural stream bed.") See also Kunz v. Utah Power& Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that an on-stream reservoir owner may assume a duty of flood control).
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ- BLACK CANYON APPEAL -NO.
13719751_1 / 30-ISI

44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

Page 43 of 49

matter) from the federal on-stream reservoirs. These operational decisions do not affect accrual
of water to the Storage Rights under Idaho law. Accordingly, the United States and its
contractors-not other water users-should bear any adverse consequences resulting from the
federal government's operational decisions.
B.

The Bureau's existing Storage Rights inherently authorize the capture
of excess water so long as other rights are not injured.

The Appellants raise the alarm that if they are not allowed to refill in priority, the federal
reservoirs may not fill. This is a false alarm. In accordance with the one-fill, storable inflow,
and paper fill principles described above, the federal reservoirs fill just fine in wet years (when
there are flood releases) because Idaho law allows them to capture "excess water."
"Excess water" is sometimes called "high flows" occurring under "free river" conditions.
Excess flows, high flows, and free river all mean the same thing: that there is more than enough
water in the system to satisfy all water rights. In other words, at that moment the system
contains some unappropriated water. As this Court has recognized, "excess water inherently
relates to water that has not been decreed." A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League
("!CL r'), 131 Idaho 411, 416, 958 P.2d 568, 573 (1997) (McDevitt, J.).
This Court has approved the practice of allowing "those who otherwise have water rights
... to use excess water when it is available." State ofIdaho v. Idaho Conservation League
("!CL IF'), 131 Idaho 329, 333, 955 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1998) (Silak, J.). Thus, the capture of high
flows when that can be done without injury to others can be recognized as an inherent, or
ancillary, part of every on-stream storage right. 31 Accordingly, excess water stored after paper
fill is water lawfully stored under the Storage Rights.

!CL I and !CL II dealt with general provisions contained in prior decrees, but this does not alter the
conclusion that Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine allows free river water to be captured ancillary to an existing
right. These decisions support the conclusion that the use of excess water by existing water right holders is allowed
under Idaho law whether or not the practice is decreed in a general provision.
31
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To be clear, the Storage Rights' ancillary entitlement to take a second fill with excess
water is not a distinct water right that can be exercised under priority. "[T]here cannot be a prior
relation to excess water." !CL I, 131 Idaho at 416,958 P.2d at 573. In other words, Idaho law
recognizes that excess water may be stored and used when it is available by "those who
otherwise have water rights," !CL II, 131 Idaho at 333, 955 P.2d at 1112, but such capture of
excess water may not impair existing rights or prevent future appropriations of that water. In
other words, the right to take excess water is subordinated to all existing and future water rights.
In short, the ancillary right to store and use excess waters can be viewed as a part and parcel of
decreed on-stream storage rights, including the United States' Storage Rights in Basin 65 (and
elsewhere).
Indeed, in the context of storage rights, allowing the storage of high flows is compelled
by the principle of maximum beneficial use. That is, if water is available for storage without
injury to others--even after paper fill-the constitutional principle of maximum use compels the
right to its capture and storage because, otherwise, that water would flow down the river unused.
Obviously, the right to refill with excess water is different than the right to store under
priority. Excess water is simply unappropriated water that, like all of Idaho's unappropriated
water, is subject to appropriation. Idaho Const. art. XV § 3 ("The right to divert and appropriate
the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied .... ").
Nevertheless, it is an entitlement that any storage right holder should embrace. Why would any
water user disavow an entitlement that could only benefit them by increasing the amount of
water they could lawfully divert?
Although excess water is not stored under priority, once stored, the right holder has a
legally protected right to its use. See Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep 't of Water
Res., 143 Idaho 862, 879, 154 P.3d 433,450 (2007) (quoting Washington County Irrigation Dist.
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v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382,385, 43 P.2d 943, 945 (1935)) ("when water is stored, it becomes 'the

property of the appropriators ... impressed with the public trust to apply it to a beneficial use.'")
Thus, the federal government owns and controls its lawfully stored excess water-just as it does
water stored under priority. Once captured, no other right holder may call for its release. The
reservoir operator may release the water for beneficial use by the spaceholders, carry it over for
future use, or release it for flood control.
Excess water and unappropriated water are the same thing; but the terms address different
things that might happen to that water. When a storage right holder takes excess water, it does
not become appropriated because he already was allowed to take it as excess water under his
existing water right. In contrast, as soon as someone else appropriates today's free river water, it
will not be excess anymore. 32
There is no dispute that flood control provides benefits to flood-threatened landowners
and communities (some who may not be water right holders). Likewise, there can be no dispute
that flood control is not an authorized purpose of use of the Storage Rights. Flood control
obligations exist, but they are not part of and they do not dictate Idaho's Prior Appropriation
Doctrine, which is concerned with diversion and beneficial use of water, not flood control. Dam
operators must (and do) balance their flood control obligations and their duty to store water for
beneficial use. Given that flood control happens in times of high water, the federal reservoirs are
virtually always refilled without injury to others by capture of excess water ancillary to the

32 This Court must reject any argument that the only excess water that is available for appropriation is water
released from Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs for flood control purposes. If that is the case, then the availability
of unappropriated water is fully dependent on the federal government's reservoir operational decisions (as they
evolve over time). If all future appropriations are thus subordinated, the federal government has effectively
appropriated every last drop of those streams. It also means that there is no such thing as unappropriated water
upstream from each reservoir's outlet-which, of course, is where the vast majority of excess waters originate.
Neither of these outcomes is consistent with Idaho law or interests. Idaho Const. art. XV§ 3 ("The right to divert
and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied .... ")

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ-BLACK CANYON APPEAL-NO.
13719751_1 / 30-151

44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017)

Page 46 of 49

Storage Rights. The clock is not broken. Replacing it with priority refill is an unnecessary and
dangerous proposition.
V.

SUEZ IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

In addition to costs, Suez seeks attorney fees on these appeals under Idaho Code
§ 12-117(1). To the extent Suez prevails on only a portion of the issues it has presented on
appeal and cross-appeal, it seeks attorney fees for the portion of the case on which it prevailed
under Idaho Code§ 12-117(2). Suez is entitled to attorney fees because the positions taken by
the Appellants are without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Late Claims are water right claims based on the alleged pre-1971 diversion and
beneficial use of water. However, neither Black Canyon nor the United States concern
themselves with proving beneficial use for those claims. Instead, they ask that the Late Claims
be deemed unnecessary. If they are unnecessary, they should have withdrawn them. What they
really seek-redefinition of the Storage Rights and/or changes in the Department's
administration of those rights-is beyond the scope of these Late Claim proceedings. They
could have sought to re-open the Storage Rights in the SRBA under I.R.C.P. 60. Or they could
have asked the Department to initiate proceedings to examine its accounting methodology. But
instead they pursued their unfounded arguments on appeal here.
The District Court carefully and thoroughly explained this to the Appellants in its
decision. That explanation should have been heeded. Instead, they have continued to pursue the
Late Claims on appeal, advocating for priority refill entitlements in the Storage Rights, which are
not before this Court. Their arguments are procedurally barred. They are also wrong on the
merits.
Accordingly, Suez is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal because these strategies are
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
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CONCLUSION

Suez asks that his Court affirm the SRBA Court's ruling in these appeals.

Respectfully submitted on June 9, 2017.
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